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A THOUSAND WORDS:
POLLARA V. SEYMOUR AND THE TREND TO
UNDER-VALUE AND UNDER-PROTECT
POLITICAL ART
INTRODUCTION
Courts agree to varying degrees that the First Amendment
protects different categorical topics (political, commercial,
indecent) of speech.' However, the category of artistic expression
provokes controversy and debate over how much First
Amendment protection it should receive,2 perhaps in part because
it fits within each of he basic categories. For example, political
art' is also political speech, which receives the highest First
Amendment protection. However, Pollara v. Seymour illustrates
that political art has not found its place among First Amendment
standards and is viewed as something less than core, political
speech.4 This Second Circuit opinion is the most recent step in a
growing trend in legislation and subsequent statutory interpretation
that treats political art as requiring a lower level of First
Amendment protection.' This trend refuses to acknowledge that
political art is political speech and therefore fails to grant the
requisite full First Amendment protection. A danger exists that
1. See infra Section I(B)(i) regarding general First Amendment standards.
2. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REv. 73, 75 (1996). First Amendment
jurisprudence "only tangentially acknowledges the force of art" illustrating that
American society has drastically undervalued the liberty enforcing power of art.
Id.
3. For the purposes of the paper "political art" will be defined simply as art
with clearly understood political content. "Political" will be loosely construed
as any subject that relates to political, social, and economic reality or study.
4. See infra Section I(C)(ii) regarding Pollara v. Seymour and the Visual
Artist Rights Act.
5. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 78. "First amendment jurisprudence should
reflect art's integral role in preserving the constitutional balance between the
governed and the governing. The existing jurisprudence falls far short of this
goal." Hamilton, supra note 2, at 78.
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courts will adopt this standard, exposing to attack a powerful and
essential contributor to the marketplace of ideas.6
This article will show that first, political art is political speech
and should be protected as such, and second, that Pollara is the
most recent step in a trend that, ironically, treats political art as
something less than political speech. Section I briefly describes
the communicative power of political art. It also discusses general
First Amendment standards and the prevailing theories for how to
apply the First Amendment to categories of artistic expression.
Importantly, both theories conclude that political art should receive
the fullest protection. The trend, illustrated by a brief discussion
of NEA v. Finley and a more detailed look at Pollara, is also
exposed in Section I. These cases show that both legislation and
statutory interpretation have resulted in political art receiving less
protection than political speech. Section II analyzes the trend,
showing that the court could have decided Pollara on other
grounds. Section III forecasts the impact Pollara could have on
political art if its low standard of protection is adopted across the
country. Finally, Section IV suggests ways in which the trend may
be reversed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Power of Political Art
Political art is an invaluable contributor to the marketplace of
ideas serving an "integral role in preserving the constitutional
balance between the governed and governing."7  Eloquently
describing such age-old themes as leadership, war, hope, reform,
vision and oppression in both intensely empathetic and bitterly
controversial ways, political art generates political and moral
debate.' Political art's democratic power is demonstrated by its
6. See infra Section I(A) regarding the power of political art to communicate.
7. Hamilton, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
8. Daniel Mach, Note: The Bold And the Beautiful: Art, Public Spaces, And
The First Amendment, 72 N.Y.U.L. REv., 383, 384 (1997). "Art has become a
258
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ability to inspire change.9 This revolutionary quality can be
measured both in art's unique communicative potential and in
historical examples of art-inspired revolution.
1. The Power of Political Art to Communicate
Political art, unlike other forms of communication such as the
written and spoken word, has the unique potential for subtle and
profound reaction and understanding across cultures, languages,
and historical periods. Judge Robert Carter of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated this notion in Bery v.
City of New York:
Visual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of
ideas, concepts and emotions as a book, treatise,
pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly entitled to
full First Amendment protection. Indeed, written
language is far more constricting because of its many
variants - English, Japanese, Arabic, Hebrew, Wolof,
Guarani, etc. - among and within each group and
because some within each language group are
illiterate and cannot comprehend their own written
language. The ideas and concepts embodied in visual
art have the power to transcend these language
limitations and reach beyond a particular language
battleground on which American society fights its most intensely political and
deeply personal wars. Because art by its very nature stimulates both intellectual
and emotional responses, it is uniquely suited to generate powerful, often
conflicting reactions in both artist and viewer. Increasingly, our most profound
cultural tensions surface when people contest the meaning and value of artistic
expression." Id. See generally Renee Linton, The Artistic Voice: Is It in
Danger of Being Silenced?, 32 CAL. W. L. REv. 195, 195 (1995). "Good art
moves your emotions or makes you think. We should be ever thankful that we
have artists among us who can make us cry, scream, or wonder. Disliked art
and art with disliked subjects can be as powerful as liked art, sometimes more
powerful. It deserves both our attention and our protection." Id.
9. Id. at 76. "Art is essential to a representative democracy because it can be
subversive."
20041 259
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group to both the educated and the illiterate. As the
Supreme Court reminded us, visual images are "a
primitive but effective way of communicating
ideas... a short cut from mind to mind."'0
Standing in front of a work of art, one does not merely receive a
message but rather experiences a message. 1  This visceral
communication, rich with both concept and emotion, can, in a
simple and profound moment, touch the viewer's intellect and
heart. Thomas Nast, the father of American political cartoons,
understood the communicative simplicity and power of images.1 2
Nast created and published cartoons unveiling and commenting on
the deep corruption of Tammany Hall, the infamous political ring
that ran New York City in the late 1800's, and its leader, Boss
Tweed.13 Irritated at his eroding power base, of Nast's drawings
10. See infra Section I(B)(ii) regarding Bery v. City of New York, 97 F. 3d
689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996).
11. Art's subversive quality lies in its ability to inspire the viewer to imagine
and experience alternate realities. The experience of art has two effects on the
viewer: the recognition of one's pre-existing worldview and a distancing,
removal from this worldview. This process functions to allow viewers to
experience many different worldviews without commitment. Hamilton, supra
note 2, at 87-88. "Through the imagination, art evinces what purely didactic art
cannot - the "sensation" of an experience never had, a world never seen." Id. at
87.
12. MORTON KELLER, THE ART AND POLITICS OF THOMAS NAST 3-4 (Oxford
University Press 1968). "The artist as social commentator has awesome
weapons - wit, symbolism, animalism - to direct at men and institutions. .. The
distortions of great caricature, the transferences wrought by animal symbolism,
the use of satiric humor, are among the most potent devices by which one man
can strike at another. They touch upon deep fears of and belief in the power to
wreak harm upon an adversary by representation, by distortion, by imagery."
Id.
13. The Tammany Hall ring, consisting of a few top dogs and many
underling rings, positioned one of their own in every area of New York city
politics. Having the run of the courts, the mayoral seat, the legislature and city
counsel position, "Boss" Tweed, Sweeny, Connelly, and Hall ran a simple con,
which emptied the city's coffers and filled their own pockets. The con was
structured as follows: anyone with a claim against the city was told to multiply
their claim by sometimes as much as 100 percent. Tammany insiders would
260
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Boss Tweed remarked, "[t]hose damned pictures; I don't care so
much what the papers write about me - my constituents can't read,
but damn it, they can see pictures!'
14
2. Political Art Inspires Change
Political artists change their political landscape by challenging
the status quo. 5 Given visual art's communicative power, "history
is replete with examples of where art threatened entrenched power
structures and in doing so secured a measure of freedom."' 6 A
couple of examples illustrate this power.
The pro-proletariat message of Mexican muralists such as Diego
Rivera, Jos6 Clemente Orozco, and David Alfaro Siqueiros had an
enormous impact on leftist politics in America in the 1920's and
1930's. 7 Rivera, upon receiving a commission from Nelson
Rockefeller for a mural in Rockefeller Center, proceeded to create
an unflattering portrait of the patron himself as a robber baron.'8
In so doing, Rivera brought to light Rockefeller's theretofore
oppressionist politics. 9 In 1934, before the mural was completed,
and in an attempt to protect his reputation, Rockefeller had the
mural destroyed." This high profile event established in the
okay the amount and the claim would be promptly paid out by the city.
However, the payment first went through the middlemen, who would extract the
original claim amount and pay it to the claimant and then deliver the remainder
to the bosses, Tweed and Connelly getting the biggest cut. ALBERT BIGELOW
PAINE, TH. NAST: HIs PERIOD AND HIs PICTURES 140-144 (The Pearson
Publishing Company 1967) (1904). Tweed published scores of cartoons in the
Times and Harper's Weekly, who joined him in the fight to ruin the Tammany
Ring. Id. at 146.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 76. See also discussion, supra note 10 (art allows people to
experience alternate realities, therefore exposing and destabilizing the status
quo).
16. BIGELOW, supra note 13, at 96.
17. LUIS-MARTIN LOZANO, MEXICAN MODERN ART 1900-1950 49 (Mayo
Graham ed., National Gallery of Canada 1999).
18. Id. at 51.
19. Id.
20. Id.
2004]
5
Davidson: A Thousand Words: Pollara v. Seymour and the Trend to Under-Value
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ.ART. &ENT. LAW [Vol.XIV:257
American mind a nexus between Mexican art and the radical leftist
politics of the Depression era, pressuring conservatives during the
New Deal reforms.2'
Similarly, Pablo Picasso's Guernica so accurately and
powerfully conveyed the ravages and despair of war that it became
influential rhetoric in multiple anti-war movements.22 Painted
originally to commemorate the obliteration of a town during the
Spanish Civil War, it was first exhibited in the Spanish Pavillion at
the Paris Exposition. 3 It subsequently toured European cities in
support of the anti-fascist movement. 24 Later, it became a source
of controversy during the Vietnam War, yet again as rhetoric for
peace.2' Today, it still holds influential power in its image: a
tapestry replica of Guernica hangs in the foyer of the United
Nations. In February 2003, before Colin Powell was to speak
about the war in Iraq, the tapestry was furtively covered with a
blue cloth because some felt that it seemed inappropriate for
Powell to speak about war in the company of such a painting.26
The ability of political art to challenge the status quo is also
demonstrated by the fear it inspires in those who wish things to
remain unchanged.2 ' Governments, afraid of political art's power
to communicate revolutionary ideas, have, throughout history,
repressed dissident art.28
21. Id.
22. Guernica: Testimony of War, available at
http://www.pbs.org/treasuresoftheworld/guemica/gmain.html (last visted July
30, 2004). Guernica has been called "modem art's most powerful anti-war
statement." Id.
David Cohen, Hidden Treasures: What's So Controversial About Picasso 's
Guernica? SLATE.COM, Thurs. Feb. 6, 2003, available at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2078242/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
23. Guernica, supra note 22.
24. Id.
25. Cohen, supra note 22.
26. Id.
27. Sheldon H. Nahmod, Article: Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory:
The Beautiful, The Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 WiS. L. REV. 221,
224,225 (1987).
28. "Because of its destabilizing character, art traditionally has been the
262
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Sure of art's emotional and cognitive influence, Marxist
states found it necessary to control political art.29 Similarly, after
the French Revolution, "artists were forced under political and
economic pressure, to follow the official line of the assembly.
Forced to choose sides, many artists left the country."3  Most
recently, the Bush Administration demonstrated its fear of
dissenting political art through its actions in Iraq. While the
Baghdad Museum was being looted, the overworked and
understaffed US Army deployed troops to destroy the famous
mosaic of Former President George Bush, Sr., who lead the first
war against Iraq.3 The mosaic, which was installed on the floor of
Baghdad's most posh hotel, was intended to serve as a doormat for
the international and American diplomats that frequented the
hotel. 2  The Government's swift choice to destroy the mosaic
demonstrates its recognition of the mural's power to communicate
anti-American sentiments.
B. First Amendment Standards
Despite art's unique ability to communicate, courts still debate
where it fits into the First Amendment. While the two main
theories on how art is protected are in conflict, a consensus does
emerge: Political art, as a sub-category, is political speech and
should be protected as such. Analyzing these theories of art and
the First Amendment in light of established First Amendment
standards shows that political art should receive the highest
protection.
target of totalitarian governments." Hamilton, supra note 2, at 99.
29. Id.
30. MOSHE CARMILLY-WEINBERGER, FEAR OF ART: CENSORSHIP AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN ART, 65 (R. R. Bowker, 1986).
31. Nayla Razzouk, Merchants Fire on Looters as Chaos Spreads in
Baghdad, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 12, 2003, at International News.
32. Id.
2004]
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1. General First Amendment Standards
First Amendment jurisprudence has divided expression into two
groups: protected and unprotected speech. The five designated
areas of unprotected expression are obscenity, fraudulent
misrepresentation, defamation, advocacy of imminent lawless
behavior, and fighting words - everything else is considered
protected expression.33
Several categories of protected expression have been delineated
including indecent speech, commercial speech, and political
speech. However, not all protected speech is equal - courts
designate certain categories of speech to be of lower value and
therefore receive something less than the fullest protection of the
First Amendment. 4
Indecent speech is sexually explicit but has not deigned to the
level of obscenity.35 While never categorically labeling indecent
speech as low-value, courts balance the burden on the speech with
the relevant state interests.36 Using this test, the courts have upheld
33. For cases placing obscenity outside the First Amendment see generally
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). For cases placing fraudulent
misrepresentation outside the First Amendment see generally Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). For cases
placing defamation outside the First Amendment see generally New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For cases
placing advocacy of imminent lawless behavior outside the First Amendment
see generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Hess v. Indiana, 414
U.S. 105 (1973). For a case placing fighting words outside the First
Amendment see generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
34. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4th
ed. 956 (Foundation Press, 2001).
35. Id. at 1091.
36. Id. at 1092. In Young v. American Mini Theaters, the Court upheld part
of a Detroit ordinance that dispersed adult movie theaters and bookstores by
prohibiting them from being within 1000 feet of any other "regulated use" (bars,
pool halls, hotels, etc.). The ordinance only applied adult movie theaters and
not to theaters showing other types of movies. In his plurality opinion, Justice
264
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several less than total restrictions on indecent speech.37 Thus,
indecent speech is implicitly of lower value than political speech.
Non-commercial speech has been differentiated from
commercial speech, which generally is expression that advertises a
product or proposes a commercial transaction. 8  Commercial
speech is the only category of expression explicitly given a lower
level protection. 9
Political speech is considered the core category of protected
speech. 40 The First Amendment is considered essential to
preserving democracy, protecting those who wish to criticize the
government and dissent from majority politics. 41  Therefore,
political expression receives the full protection of the First
Amendment.
2. First Amendment Protection ofArt Speech
While generally accepted as protected, the degree of artistic
expression's First Amendment protection is less settled.42
Stevens found that the indecent speech at issue was of lower-value than that of
core, political speech. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 52
(1976). "It is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of
expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in
untrammeled political debate .. " Id. at 70.
37. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, at 1061-62.
38. SULLIVAN, supra note 34,at 1121.
39. SULLIVAN, supra note 34, at 1121.
40. Bery v. New York, 97 F.3d 689, 694 (2d Cir. 1996).
The First Amendment has surely been valued as essential to
the preservation of a political democracy in this country; thus,
even the pamphleteer espousing political sedition has been
shielded from government suppression.. .It is no doubt true
that the central purpose of the First Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of government affairs.
Id.
41. Id.
42. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 101. "Although the Supreme Court has
recognized, since at least 1952, that art should receive some first amendment
protection, it has yet to provide a theory to undergird the assertion, or to make
clear how much protection art ought to receive." See infra Section I.B.ii
2004]
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Traditionally, the First Amendment bases its protection on the
content of clearly understood ideas. 3 The root of the debate about
art's First Amendment standard concerns whether art contains both
discursive and nondiscursive works." That is, some artworks have
a clear message or idea and others do not. For example
Washington Crossing the Delaware by Emanuel Leutze is a clear
historical account of a brave General Washington and his band of
ragged men crossing the frigid river.45 In contrast Mark Rothko's
No.2, 1951, which has floating color fields that meld together
sublimely, does not communicate a clear idea.46  Rothko's
painting, with no identifiable message, appears to have no
objective content to protect, or at least protect to the fullest degree.
Because the current structure of the First Amendment is based on
the content of what is expressed, the courts and scholars have
struggled to establish a theory that can incorporate, in a
meaningful way, artistic expression by Mr. Leutze and Mr. Rothko
into the First Amendment at the same time.47
regarding two circuit court cases, Bery v. New York and Close v. Lederle which
consider whether artworks are protected by the First Amendment but use two
very different analyses which are discussed further in this section.
43. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 103.
44. Hamilton delineates this notion of discursive and nondiscursive.
Discursive works communicate a clear and understandable idea or message.
The content (i.e. the idea or message) can be separated from the medium (i.e.
the paint and canvas or bronze). Nondiscursive works, on the other hand, have
what Hamilton refers to as "extrarational" elements and do not communicate an
obvious idea. The emotive, expressive part of these works cannot be easily
separated from the thing itself. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 103, 106-07.
45. Emanuel Leutze, Washington Crossing the Delaware, 1851,
Metropolitan Museum of Art. An image of this painting is available at
http://www.metmuseum.org/explore/gw/el-gw.htm (last visited July 30, 2004).
46. Mark Rothko, No. 2 (No. 7 and No. 2), 1951 (alternatively dated to
1950), Collection of Mrs. Paul Mellon, Upperville, Virginia. An image of this
painting and others as well as a history of Mark Rothko's career is available at
http://www.nga.gov/exhibitions/rothwel.htm (last visited July 30, 2004).
47. Many works of art have discursive content, and therefore the First
Amendment undeniably protects those works. However, this method of basing
protection on the discursive content forces courts to look for such content in
every work of art. This case-by-case analysis causes courts to wrestle with what
266
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There are two main theories that offer methods for how and to
what extent the First Amendment should be applied to art. The
first theory, which, for simplicity's sake, will be called the
Categorical Theory, reasons that the current categorical framework
of First Amendment jurisprudence should be applied to artistic
expression.48 The medium and content should be pulled apart and
the content analyzed separately as if it were any other form of
speech.49  After determining which category (unprotected,
indecent, commercial or political) of expression the content fits
into, the appropriate level of protection is then applied. This
process requires a case-by-case evaluation of each work of art."
In Close v. Lederle, the First Circuit utilized the Categorical
Theory of applying the First Amendment to artworks when the
plaintiffs artwork was removed from an exhibition." The
plaintiff, an art instructor, was asked by his employer, a university,
to exhibit some of his artwork." Though scheduled to last twenty-
four days, after just five the university removed the exhibit from
public view due to the controversy it inspired. 3 The plaintiff
to do with artwork that has nondiscursive content. Hamilton, supra note 2, at
108.
48. Christina A. Mathes, Bery v. New York: Do Artists Have A First
Amendment Right To Sell And Display Art in Public Places? 5 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 103, 109-10 (1998). Explaining that the courts have previously
recognized that "there are varying degrees of speech which should receive
different levels of protection, depending on the subject matter." Id. at 110.
49. "The Court tends to measure art by its similarities to ordinary speech,
rather than by its distinctive structural function that cannot be reduced to the
terms of ordinary communication." Hamilton, supra note 2, at 108.
50. "By basing art's protection on its discursive content, however, these
theories compel the courts to find such content in every work of art and force
them to struggle with artworks whose communicative essence is nondiscursive
and nonrational." Hamilton, supra note 2, at 108-09.
51. "There are degrees of speech" and the degree of protection depends on
the subject matter. Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d 988, 990 (1st Cir. 1970).
52. Id. at 989.
53. The plaintiffs paintings inspired controversy due to their edgy content.
Several of the works contained nudes, in which both female and male genitalia
were described in "clinical detail." One of the paintings was of a skeleton
whose only flesh consisted of such genitalia. Several of the titles were also
2004]
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claimed this was a violation of his constitutional rights. 4 The
court found that there was "no suggestion, unless in its cheap titles,
that plaintiffs art was seeking to express political or social
thought. '55 It therefore found the "plaintiffs constitutional interest
minimal" and held that the artist's First Amendment rights were
not infringed. 6 Thus, separating the content from the medium
allows art that communicates political ideas to receive full
protection but, correspondingly, art that communicates lesser ideas
receives lesser protection.
Under the second theory, which will be called the Democratic
Theory, all art should be afforded the highest level of protection. 7
The Democratic Theory is founded not on the traditional First
Amendment framework relied upon by the Categorical Theory, but
rather on recognizing art's unique and highly valuable ability to
communicate both discursively as well as nondiscursively.58 The
traditional framework of the First Amendment bases protection on
the content of the expression and thus leaves little room for
irrational or noncognitive artistic expression. 9 This group argues
controversial including, "I'm only 12 and already my mother's lover wants me"
and "I am the only virgin in my school." These paintings were displayed in a
hallway that was used by the public, and as the court noted, children. Id. at 990.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. "To realize art's full contribution to the First Amendment's task of
shoring up counterweights to government, the doctrine must elevate art's value
to the pinnacle of first amendment protection as it recognizes art's extrarational
value." Hamilton, supra note 2, at 110.
58. Hamilton notes that:
The Court should consciously elevate art to the top of the First
Amendment's pyramid of protection, alongside political
speech. There will be times when it is political speech, but
even when it is not, it furthers the constitutional goal of
placing parameters around government. The Court should
reject attempts to fit art into the existing speech paradigms,
which devalue its distinctive challenge capacities.
Hamilton, supra note 2, at 110.
59. "The marketplace of ideas theory of the first amendment does not
properly account for the noncognitive aspects of artistic expression." Nahmod,
268
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that rather than the content, the expression's ability to encourage
democracy and challenge the status quo should be determinative of
its First Amendment protection level.6" Using the Democratic
Theory, art, like political speech, philosophy, and religion receives
the fullest protection.6'
The Second Circuit recognized this theory in Bery v. New York.62
At issue was the General Vendors Law of New York that required
a license for those who wished to sell goods or services in public
spaces.63 Those who sold books, newspapers and other written
matter were exempt from the licensing requirement.' The
plaintiffs, artists who were restricted from selling their artwork in
public without a license, argued that the law violated their First
Amendment rights.65 The District Court, applying the Categorical
Theory held that the art in question was "decorative" and
"apolitical" and therefore deserved only limited First Amendment
protection in the absence of government censorship.66 Due to the
fact that there was no censorship and no animus towards the
artists, it considered the statute to be content-neutral, requiring
only minimal scrutiny.67
The Second Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that
parsing artistic expression into categories such as "apolitical"
demonstrated a "myopic vision... [that] fundamentally
misperceives the essence of visual communication and artistic
expression."68 The court articulated a view in line with the
Democratic Theory, recognizing the difficulty of drawing a line
supra note 27, at 262.
60. "Rather than fitting all other types of first amendment interests into the
existing rational speech paradigm, the democratic propensities of the particular
expression should be identified in light of the First Amendment's challenge
functions." Hamilton, supra note 2, at 111.
61. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 111.
62. Bery v. New York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996).
63. Id. at 692.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 693.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Bery, 97 F.3d at 695.
2004] 269
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between discursive art and nondiscursive art.6 9 Due to this broad
range of artistic expression, the court found that all artistic
expression must be fully protected by the First Amendment. 7' The
court held the ordinance violated the plaintiff's First Amendment
rights.7"
For the purposes of protecting political art, either the Categorical
Theory or the Democratic Theory will suffice. The proposed
theories, one dividing art into categories receiving varying levels
of protection and one granting art as a category full protection,
both share a common theme: political art, like political speech,
should receive the highest level of First Amendment protection.72
The next sections of this article will show that while it should
receive full protection, there is a growing trend to treat political art
as something less than political speech. Consequently political art
is not receiving the appropriate full First Amendment protection.
C. The Trend: Political Art Receives Less Protection than
Political Speech
Political artists have employed the National Endowment for the
Arts and the Visual Artist Rights Act to protect their artistic
expression. These statutes were created to protect and promote the
arts. As discussed above, political art is capable of communicating
political ideas and therefore should receive the same high-level
First Amendment protection as political speech. However, these
statutes have been ironically construed to give political art a lesser
protection.
69. "Written and visual expression do not always allow for neat separation:
words may form part of a work of art, and images may convey messages and
stories.. .Visual artwork is as much an embodiment of the artist's expression as
is a written text, and the two cannot always be readily distinguished." Id.
70. Id. at 696.
71. Id. at 698.
72. See discussion, supra notes 34-36 (explaining how artistic expression
should be parsed into categories and given varying levels of protection). See
discussion, supra note 43 (explaining the Democratic Theory's view that all
artistic expression should be given full First Amendment protection).
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1. National Endowment for the Arts
The National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA") is a program
that distributes Government grants to selected artists in the hope of
promoting and encouraging the arts." "Artistic excellence and
artistic merit are the criteria by which applications are judged,
taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect
for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public."74 The
statute automatically disqualifies any art found to be obscene, but,
otherwise, the "decency and respect" clause is the agency's only
guide when selecting the grant recipients." This clause provides
73. National Endowment for the Arts 20 U.S.C.S. § 954 (c) states -
Program of contracts, grants-in-aid, or loans to groups and
individuals for projects and productions; traditionally
underrepresented recipients of financial assistance. The
Chairperson, with the advice of the National Council on the
Arts, is authorized to establish and carry out a program of
contracts with, or grants-in-aid or loans to, groups or, in
appropriate cases, individuals of exceptional talent engaged in
or concerned with the arts.
20 U.S.C.S. § 954 (c) (2004).
74. 20 U.S.C.S. § 954 (d)(1) states -
Application for payment; regulations and procedures. No
payment shall be made under this section except upon
application therefore which is submitted to the National
Endowment for the Arts in accordance with regulations issued
and procedures established by the Chairperson. In
establishing such regulations and procedures, the Chair person
shall ensure that - artistic excellence and artistic merit are the
criteria by which applications are judged, taking into
consideration general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the American public.
20 U.S.C.S. § 954 (d)(1) (2004).
75. 20 U.S.C.S. § 954 (d)(2) states -
Such regulations and procedures shall clearly indicate that
obscenity is without artistic merit, is not protected speech, and
shall not be funded. Projects, productions, workshops, and
programs that are determined to be obscene are prohibited
from receiving financial assistance under this Act from the
National Endowment for the Arts.
2004]
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the NEA with an enormous amount of leeway to determine what is
decent and respectful.76
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Supreme
Court decided a facial challenge to the NEA.77 Four artists who
allegedly were denied NEA funding due to the political content of
their artwork argued that, "the criteria in Section 954(d)(1) are
sufficiently subjective that the agency could utilize them to engage
in viewpoint discrimination. ' 78  The Court held that Section
954(d)(1) did not, on its face, infringe on First Amendment rights
because it merely added further subjectivity to an already
subjective process. Since the statute instructs the government to
simply take "decency and respect" into consideration, the Court
found that it is not obvious that the clause will be used for
viewpoint discrimination.79 In coming to this conclusion, the
Court recognized that, in the area of subsidies, the Government
may use criteria that would otherwise be impermissible were direct
regulation at issue.8" The Court stated that "artists may conform
their speech to what they believe to be the decision-making criteria
in order to acquire funding. But when the Government is acting as
patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision
"181are not constitutionally severe.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter argued that section
954(d)(1) should be struck down since the "decency and respect"
clause was overbroad and had the potential to "chill artistic
production and display. '82 He explained that when determining
whether a provision violates the First Amendment, the Court asks
whether the government is regulating the speech because it
disagrees with its message.83 Souter argued that the "decency and
20 U.S.C.S. § 954 (d)(2) (2004).
76. Linton, supra note 5, at 213.
77. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 583 (1998).
78. Id. at 583.
79. Id. at 582.
80. Id. at 587.
81. Id. at 589.
82. Id. at 622 (J. Souter, dissenting).
83. Nat'l Endowment, 524 U.S at 603 (J. Souter, dissenting).
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respect" proviso is meant to deny funding to artists whose work
contains an offensive message. 4 The clause's author stated that
the bill "adds to the criteria of artistic excellence and artistic merit,
a shell, a screen, a viewpoint that must be constantly taken into
account."85
While the Court upheld the NEA's criteria for distributing
funding in Finley, there is evidence that the intended purpose and
effect of the "decency and respect" clause was to give the agency
the power to deny funding to art that conveys an offensive or
marginalized viewpoint.86 The debates in the Congressional
Record, which often centered on homosexual themes in art, leave
"little doubt that the purpose of the Decency Clause was to deny
funding to artistic works dealing with specific subjects that
particular members of Congress opposed."87
2. Visual Artist Rights Act
Another example of legislation intended to protect artists is the
Visual Artist Rights Act ("VARA").88 VARA is a federal law
84. Id.
85. Id. at 604 (J. Souter, dissenting).
86. Linton, supra note 5, at 213-14.
87. Linton, supra note 5, at 213 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. H9433 (daily ed. Oct.
11, 1990) (statement of Rep. Crane); Cong. Rec. H9439 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
1990) (statement of Rep. Dorman); 136 Cong. Rec. S16,627 (daily ed. Oct. 24,
1990) (statement of Sen. Helms); 136 Cong. Rec. H9438 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
1990) (statement by Rep. Doman); 136 Cong. Rec. H9442 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
1990) (statement by Rep. Rohrabacher); 136 Cong. Rec. S 17,980 (daily ed. Oct.
24, 1990) (statement by Sen. Helms); 135 Cong. Rec. H35110-13 (daily ed.
June 29, 1989) (statement by Rep. Dannemeyer); 135 Cong. Rec. H5635 (daily
ed. Sept. 13, 1989) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer)).
88. 17 USC § 106A(a)(1)(A) and (B) state in relevant part:
Subject to section 107 and independent of the exclusive rights
provided in section 106, the author of a work of visual art
shall have the right - (A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any
work of visual art which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as
the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion,
2004] 273
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incorporating the moral rights doctrine into American law.89
Moral rights are premised on the notion that artists retain certain
rights in their artworks that do not stem from contract or copyright
law.9" These rights acknowledge that the artwork remains
intimately born from the artist's personality and expression even
after its sale to a third party.9' The two moral rights incorporated
into VARA are the right of integrity and the right of attribution.92
Prior to the enactment of VARA, many states passed moral
rights statutes that varied in policy and purpose.93 The New York
mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall
have the right -
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or
her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of that work is a violation of
that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature,
and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that
work is a violation of that right.
17 USC § 106 (2004).
89. GERSTENBLITH, ART AND THE LAW 85 (Carolina Academic Press
forthcoming). Moral rights, or droit moral, such as the rights of integrity,
attribution, disclosure, and resale royalty first gained acceptance in Europe
during the French Revolution. The rights of integrity and attribution were
incorporated into the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works of 1886. However, common law countries such as the United
States and the United Kingdom have been reluctant to accept rights that survive
even after the sale of property. Id.
90. Id.
91. Unlike copyrights or other property rights, moral rights are so personal
that they are considered unwaivable and unalienable and therefore would last at
least as long as the artist's lifetime. Id.
92. Id. The right of integrity gives an artist the right to prevent the
destruction or mutilation of their artwork. The right of attribution, which is not
specifically at issue in this note, gives an artist the right to "have his or her name
removed if the work becomes mutilated and no longer represents the author's
original creation. Id.
93. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 89, at 97.
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statute and the California statute illustrate this spectrum.94 The
New York statute was enacted to protect the artist's rights in their
work; however, a violation of the statute does not occur until the
artist's reputation has been injured.9 5 Thus, the statute does not
give the absolute right to enjoin the mutilation or modification of a
work - it only prohibits the exhibition of such altered or distorted
works when such display would injure the reputation of the artist.96
The California statute, unlike the New York statute, exists
primarily to protect and preserve significant works of art for the
public benefit.97
In 1990, in an effort to conform to the Berne Convention, the
United States passed VARA, granting artists qualified rights of
integrity and attribution.98 The rights given as well as the policies
and purposes behind them were a synthesis of the pre-existing
New York and California moral rights statutes.99 VARA takes
from New York the qualified right of attribution and the right of
integrity - the right to stop any "intentional distortion, mutilation
or other modification of that work" only occurs if it "would be
prejudicial to [the artist's] honor or reputation." "' VARA gives to
94. See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 89, at 97.
95. See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 89, at 97.
96. See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 89, at 97.
97. See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 89, at 97.
98. See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 89, at 108. In 1988 the United States
passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act. The Berne Convention
incorporated the rights of integrity and attribution through Article 6bis(1):
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after
the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation, or other modification or other derogatory action in
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honour or reputation.
See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 89, at 108.
99. See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 89, at 108.
100. 17 USCS § 106A(3)(A) (2004). Note that this section of VARA does
not allow artists to prevent the destruction of their artworks. The policy behind
this section is to protect the artist's reputation stemming from their intended
expression. The rationale is that the destruction of an artwork is not injurious to
an artist's reputation because it is not displayed in public where other's could
2004] 275
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creators of "work of recognized stature" a broader right of
integrity that allows them to prevent the work's destruction.'
Borrowed from the California statute, Congress' intent is to
preserve important works for the public benefit.1 12
The Statute further limits the scope of moral rights by applying
the statute only to "works of visual art" and then strictly defining
what this category includes. Most relevant for this paper is this
limiting clause which excludes from a "work of visual art... any
merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive,
covering or packaging material or container."'0 3
In Pollara v. Seymour, the Second Circuit held that the appellant
was not protected by VARA when the banner he created was taken
down and ripped into several pieces. 4 The appellant's banner was
created for the Gideon Coalition, "a non-profit group that provides
legal services to the poor."'0 5 The banner, consisting of a visual
depiction of people of all ages and races waiting in long lines in
front of doors titled "Public Defender," "Legal Aid," and
get a false impression of the artist's intent. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 89, at 97.
101. 17 U.S.C. 106A(3)(B) states - [The author of a work of visual art shall
have the right -] (B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature,
and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of
that right. Id.
102. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 89, at 108.
103. 17 USCS § 101 in relevant part (emphasis added) states -
A "work of visual art" does not include -
(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram,
model, applied art, motion picture or other audio-visual work,
book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic
information service, electronic publication, or similar
publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional,
descriptive, covering or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or
(ii);
any work made for hire;
any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
17 USCS § 101 (2004).
104. Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2003).
105. Id. at 266.
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"Prisoners Legal Services," was made to hang above an
information table in the government office plaza during the Gideon
Collation's Lobbying Day."6 Due to a permit problem, the banner
was taken down in the middle of the night and in the process
ripped into three pieces and piled in the corner of an office."°7
The court stated that VARA does not protect artwork that
"advertises" or "promotes" regardless of its artistic merit or
value.0 8 The appellant argued that the banner had a political
message that was non-commercial and therefore not the sort of
commercial advertising that Congress intended to exclude.' 9
Despite the plain meaning of the statutory text"' and legislative
history,"' the court held that "promoting" has broader application
than commercial advertising. 12 Concluding that the banner's
purpose was to promote "in word and picture a lobbying message,"
the court held that the banner was not protected by VARA."3
A concurring opinion affirming for different reasons, found that
the majority's reading of VARA was overbroad."' The
106. Id.
107. Id. at 267.
108. Id. at 269.
109. Id. at 270.
110. When read in context, the clause contains a series of adjectives
(advertising, promotional, descriptive), which describe four alternatives
(covering material, packaging material, covering container or packaging
container). Thus, the language of the statute does indicate that anything that
promotes is ineligible for protection under VARA but rather certain promotional
covering and packaging materials and containers.
111. When referring to this section of the Act, legislators spoke only of
marketing and advertising materials and never went so far as to suggest that this
section would exclude any artwork that promotes a message. See 135 Cong Rec
E 2199 (extension of remarks June 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)
"[VARA] specifically excludes reproductions.. .merchandising and advertising
materials" (statement of Rep. Markey) "This bill explicitly excludes from
coverage any motion picture, video... poster, periodical, book, electronic
publication, advertising item, or any work made for hire." These statements are
available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
112. Pollara, 344 F.3d at 270.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 271 (Glesson, J., concurring).
2004]
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concurrence argued that under the majority's reasoning, "a
painting commissioned to promote the Olympics, or a sculpture
commissioned to promote AIDS awareness, could never receive
protection under VARA."' 1 5  Contrary to the majority, the
promotional purpose of the banner should only be one factor in
determining whether the work was "merely promotional
material."116
Two statutes passed to protect art and artists, the NEA and
VARA, have both been interpreted to potentially exclude political
art from their protection." 7 While these statutes afford rights and
protections such as government funding and the enjoining of any
intentional distortion or mutilation to many artists, both statutes
have been interpreted to leave little legal recourse for political
artists. This low level of protection given to political art is at odds
with the First Amendment theories that argue political art is
political speech and therefore deserves the same high-level
protection. 8
II. THE NEXT STEP: AN ANALYSIS OF POLLARA
The Second Circuit wrongly decided Pollara v. Seymour and in
doing so took another step past NEA v. Finley in establishing a
contradictory and illogical First Amendment standard for political
art. The court could have decided Pollara on other grounds, such
as determining that the banner was not a work of recognized
stature and therefore not eligible for protection against destruction
under section 106A(3)(B) of the Act, or alternatively, that the
removing and ripping of the banner in Pollara was not injurious to
the plaintiffs reputation under section 106(3)(A). "9
First, the court could have found that Pollara was not eligible for
protection under § 106A(3)(B). This section applies only to
115. Id. (Glesson, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 272 (Glesson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
117. Finley, 524 U.S. at 604; Pollara, 344 F.3d at 272.
118. See discussion, supra Section II.B.ii.
119. See discussion, supra notes 99 and 100.
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creators of works of recognized stature."' 0 Since the work was new
and had only been on display for a matter of hours, it would be
very unlikely that Pollara could meet her burden of proving the
banner was of recognized stature.
12
'
Second, the court could have also found that Pollara was not
eligible for protection under Section 106(3)(A). This section only
provides protection against mutilation or modification that would
be deleterious to the artist's reputation. 2 2  Whether or not the
artist's reputation is at risk has previously rested on whether the
mutilated or modified work is displayed publicly so that viewers
may mistakenly assume that the altered work is as the artist
intended. 23 In Pollara, the ripped banner was not replaced in the
plaza but rather piled in a corner.' 24  Thus, the Second Circuit
could have held the artist's work did not fit within either provision
of VARA and therefore was not eligible for protection.
Instead of deciding the case on the grounds stated above, the
court went to great lengths to interpret the meaning of the statutory
exemption of "any merchandising item or advertising,
promotional, descriptive, covering or packaging material or
container."'25  Honing in on the adjective "promotional" and
changing it to the verb "promotes," the Second Circuit ignored the
120. See supra note 100.
121. Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612. (7th Cir. 1999). The
test for whether a work of recognized stature requires (1) that the visual art is
question has "stature," i.e. is viewed as meritorious, and (2) that this stature is
"recognized" by art experts, other members of the artistic community, or by
some cross-section of society. While the court stated that it is likely that an
expert witness will be required to meet this burden, insinuating that the burden
is a substantial one, it ultimately found that a handful of newspaper clippings
and letters were sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiff's artwork was of
recognized stature. Id. at 612-13. It is unlikely that Pollara could even meet
this low standard.
122. See discussion, supra note 99.
123. See discussion, supra note 96.
124. Pollara, 344 F.3d at 267.
125. See discussion, supra note 85, at (A)(ii). See also Pollara, supra note
103, at 269-71.
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plain meaning of the statutory text 126 and legislative history 127 to
arrive at a startlingly broad interpretation: VARA does not protect
any artwork that promotes a cause or idea. 28  While this
interpretation surely encompasses commercial advertising and
marketing designs its over-breadth reaches to pull in political art as
well. 129 In other words, according to the Second Circuit, VARA
does not protect political art.
The result is that artwork containing apolitical subject matter or
even indecent subject matter will be eligible for VARA protection
while political art may not. This conclusion contradicts the one
principle that the First Amendment theories of artistic expression
have in common: that political art should receive the highest
protection - the same protection as political speech. 3 °
III. THE IMPACT OF THE TREND ON POLITICAL ART
The trend to view political art as something less than political
speech renders political art's level of First Amendment protection
ambiguous. Without full First Amendment protection, political
art, an extremely powerful and democratic voice is exposed to
attack. That the Second Circuit went from Bery, the case elevating
all art to the highest protection, to Pollara, the case that apparently
denies moral rights to political artists, illustrates how vulnerable
political art is. This vulnerability is enhanced during times of
political anxiety - the government becomes fearful of those
promoting unfavorable messages."' The last three years has been
one of these times.
In the months and years following September 11, 2001, the
United States government has been distrustful of criticism of its
126. See supra note 110.
127. See supra note 111.
128. See also Pollara, 344 F.3d at 270. "Drawings and paintings are
protected, but only if they do not advertise or promote." Id.
129. Pollara, 344 F.3d at 271 (Glesson, J., concurring).
130. See discussion, supra Section I.A.ii.
131. See discussion, supra Section I.B.ii regarding Bery v. New York and
Section I.C.ii containing an analysis of Pollara v. Seymour.
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agenda. In early December, 2001 only months after the World
Trade Center attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft made a
statement in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee to critics of
the Bush Administration's tactics in investigating terrorism.3 2 He
stated:
To those that who pit Americans against
immigrants and citizens against noncitizens, to those
who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost
liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid
terrorists, for they erode our national unity and
diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to
America's enemies, and pause to America's
friends.'33
In this statement Ashcroft calls into question the patriotism of
those that dissent. 34 The accusation of aiding terrorists practically
criminalizes criticism or at the very least threatens a moral stain on
those who question the Government's policies. More recently, in
the summer of 2003, as President Bush attempted to align political
support for military action in Iraq, he warned members of the UN
Security Council: "You are either with us or against us. 1 135 Two
years after Ashcroft's statement, the call for political conformity
continues.
As further evidence of this anxiety, Attorney General Ashcroft
has ordered the FBI to follow up every tip that contains
information threatening to national security.'36 This has resulted in
"the FBI and Secret Service.. .harassing artists and activists"
132. A Nation Challenged: Excerpts from Attorney General's Testimony
Before Senate Judiciary Committee, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at
B6.
133. Id.
134. The Ashcroft Smear, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 7, 2001 at A40.
135. Tan Siok Choo, Right to Dissent Being Eroded- Even in that Bastion of
Freedom, NEW STRAITS TIMES-MANAGEMENT TIMES June 8, 2003.
136. Kris Axtman, Political Dissent Can Bring Federal Agents to Door, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 8, 2002, at 1 (quoting Jill Spillman, an FBI
agent assigned to the Justice Department). "Remarks made toward the president
in an antagonistic way are checked out by the Secret Service."
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through surprise visits from federal agents.137 In December of
2001, two FBI agents visited the Art Car Museum in Houston,
Texas.'38 Arriving before the Museum was to open, the agents
informed Donna Huanca, the docent, that they had received several
reports of "anti-American" activity at the Museum.'39 The
Museum was opening "'Secret Wars,' an exhibit on US covert
operations and government secrets." 4 ° For an hour the agents
examined the artwork, sneering, scoffing and questioning Huanca
about where the artists were from, who funded the museum, and
whether her mother knew she worked at "a place like this." ''
While the FBI deemed the exhibit "not dangerous" after the visit,
the Museum felt the visit was "intimidating and unnecessary.' 4 2
Huanca said she "was definitely pale. It was scary because I was
alone, and they were really big guys."' 43
Countless other critics and dissidents, including famous artists
such as Tim Robbins, Susan Sarandon, Janeane Garofalo, Sean
Penn and the music group The Dixie Chicks, have lost jobs, have
been subject to boycott, or have been called unpatriotic, anti-
American, or un-American for speaking out against the
government.'"
137. Matthew Rothschild, The New McCarthyism, THE PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 1,
2002, at 18.
138. Axtman, supra note 136, at 1; see also Rothschild, supra note 137, at
18.
139. Axtman, supra note 136, at 1.
140. Axtman, supra note 136, at 1.
141. Rothschild, supra note 137, at 18.
142. Axtman, supra note 136, at 1.
143. Rothschild, supra note 137, at 18. Barry Reigngold, a resident of San
Francisco, had a similarly intimidating experience when he awoke from a nap to
find two FBI agents at his door. While he initially had no idea why the FBI
would be interested in him, the agents explained that they knew what gym he
worked out at and that he had been making remarks critical of the President
there. One of the people from the gym had reported him to the government.
Mr. Reigngold ended the conversation when the FBI agents informed him that
he was entitled to his freedom of speech. The agents, however, notified him that
they would still have to make a report. Mr. Reigngold was left feeling "shaken
up" and nervous after the surprise visit. Axtman, supra note 136, at 1.
144. Pat Nason, Hollywood Analysis: Cost of Free Speech, UNITED PRESS
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During a time of such political nervousness it is important that
the First Amendment adequately protect expression that helps keep
the government in check, maintaining the balance and
accountability between the people and their leaders.'45
Unfortunately, Pollara sets another precedent that political art
does not receive the same amount of protection as political speech.
If this notion were adopted, the free expression and dissemination
of political art, an established mechanism for challenge and change
would be at risk of becoming one of this era's casualties.
IV. CONCLUSION
Political art reaches both hearts and minds, and as Ashcroft
warns, "diminishes our resolve" to rush, without conversations,
into decisions of enormous consequence. 46 Because of this, it is
important that political art receive the full protection of the First
Amendment. Political art can be elevated to its rightful place
within political speech through common law and legislative action.
First, the courts must take up the challenge of providing a clear
articulation of art's First Amendment standard and boldly
acknowledge that political art is political speech. Second, the
legislature must be more careful in its drafting. The rights
delivered must be clear and the restrictions placed must be sharply
delineated so as to avoid statutory interpretations that devalue
political art.
Brooke Davidson
INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 21, 2003. See also Rothschild, supra note 136, at 18.
145. See discussion, supra note 7.
146. See discussion, supra note 132.
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